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  Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: 
Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element
Peter L. Strauss*
Imagine a visitor who seeks to catalog the variety of written texts American government uses
to communicate its powers and its citizens’ rights and obligations.  She might organize those texts
into the following pyramid:
A Constitution, adopted by “the people”
Hundreds of statutes, adopted by an elected Congress
Thousands of regulations, adopted by politically responsible executive officials
Tens of thousands of interpretations and other guidance documents, issued by responsible bureaus
Countless advice letters, press releases, and other statements of understanding, generated by individual bureaucrats
On inquiry she would find that we understand passably well the ordering and influence of the top
three layers of this structure.  Our legal system treats each of them as binding text, subject only to
the requirements that it be authorized by the superior authority and appropriately adopted follow-
DRAFT.  All rights reserved.
Not for citation, quotation or further distribution without the author’s written consent.
     1   5 U.S.C. 551.
     2   5 U.S.C. 553.  Staff offices preparing publication rules frequently do tell those likely to be affected that they are doing
so, and provide an opportunity for exchange, but not within the formal structures of Section 553.  See n. 108 within
     3   5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1) and (2).
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ing designated procedures; if valid, each of them has legislative effect on government and citizen
alike, until displaced by another text validly adopted at the same or a higher level.  She would
find, too, that the innumerable items at the base of this pyramid, while often in fact influential on
private conduct, are denied any formal jural effect.  It is at the fourth level that she would find
confusion – confusion whether these “publication rules,” as we will call them for reasons that will
presently appear, are legitimate instruments of agency policy or a ruse to evade the higher proce-
dural obligations associated with adopting regulations; confusion whether an agency may give
them any jural effect and, if so, to what degree; and confusion whether and to what extent they
must be respected by the courts.
This article seeks to explicate these publication rules – interpretative rules, statements of
general policy, staff manuals, and the like – as an important element in the hierarchy of agency
law.  Publication rules, undoubtedly rules within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure
Act,1 are generally adopted at staff levels within an agency to guide both staff conduct and public
knowledge, without following the notice and comment procedures of Section 553 of that act.2  If
they have been published, however, Section 552(a)(1) and (2)3 permit agencies to rely upon  them
in their dealings with the public.  Publication rules would include the advice the Internal Revenue
DRAFT  All rights reserved.
Not for citation, quotation or further distribution without the author’s written consent.
4   See, e.g., Heclo Products Co. v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1943), distinguished in Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) and National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689 (D.C.Cir. 1971)
.
5   443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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publishes telling the public how it interprets IRS statutes and regulations; regulatory guidance
from the Food and Drug Administration or the Federal Aviation Administration, spelling out in
detail for manufacturers subject to their regulation courses of action the agency’s staff has decided
it will accept as establishing compliance with FDA or FAA regulatory requirements; and manuals
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration issues to its inspectors, instructing them how
to perform inspections and how they should respond to particular conditions they may find – by
seeking a fine, by asking for correction, and so forth.
These rules are common and generally salutary forms of informal agency action, in use well
before the Administrative Procedure Act was enacted in 1946,4 and their volume greatly exceeds
that of notice-and-comment regulation. [This article uses the word “rule” to connote any action
meeting APA Section 551's definition of “rule,” and the word “regulation” to signify a rule that is
adopted following Section 553's notice and comment procedures, that must be published in the
Federal Register and that, if valid, has the effect of a statute on all actors.]  To take just one ex-
ample, consider the facts revealed by National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council v.
Shultz,5 written three decades ago by Judge Harold Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit.  He learned that
the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Administration annually responded to 750,000 re-
quests for advice about the interpretation and application of the Fair Labor Standards Act; 10,000
DRAFT.  All rights reserved.
Not for citation, quotation or further distribution without the author’s written consent.
6   See text infra at p. 24 et seq.
     7435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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of these responses were signed by the Administrator herself , and the rest by staff.   These advi-
sory letters were interpretative rules, he concluded; the question he had to decide was whether the
letter before him was “final agency action” ripe for review.6  
When the author of this article was General Counsel of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in
1975-77 – the years, readers may recognize, just preceding the Supreme Court’s decision in Ver-
mont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.7 – any regulation
the Commission adopted was considered, often in detail, by the five Commissioners themselves. 
These Commission regulations generally set performance standards for nuclear safety, as even
then was thought preferable, rather than specify the details of design – a difference often identified
in the literature as that between having “standards” and having “rules.”  The bulk of the work for
one of the Commission’s five bureaus was continually to generate guidance for license applicants
and others about technical design issues raised by these regulatory standards.  It issued this guid-
ance in a volume dwarfing the regulations; and these guidance instruments, which the Commission
expected to be the product of informal consultation by responsible staff with affected parties,
were supervised by the Commission in only a general way.  Another Bureau, in charge of inspec-
tions and enforcement, produced copious guidance for the Commission’s inspectors.  Both sorts
of guidance, understandably, were earnestly sought out by those the Commission regulated and
greatly influenced their conduct; from an internal perspective they also contributed to the disci-
DRAFT  All rights reserved.
Not for citation, quotation or further distribution without the author’s written consent.
8   5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A).
9      ... [S]ubsection (b) of S. 1160 would require agencies to make available statements of policy,
interpretations, staff manuals, and instructions that affect any member of the public.  This material is the
end product of Federal administration.  It has the force and effect of law in most cases, yet under the
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pline of staff action, its predictability and regularity.  Similar practices and proportions, in re-
sponse to similar levels of public demand for guidance and central agency interest in controlling a
far-flung staff, can be found at many if not all regulatory agencies.  The result is an enormous
output of publication rules, far greater than the pages of the Federal Register, and (in proportional
terms) rarely challenged in litigation.
The provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act appear straightforwardly to acknowledge
the existence of publication rules, and provide minimal procedures to govern their adoption. 
Section 553, which defines notice and comment procedures for regulations, has from the begin-
ning excepted from those procedures “interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules
of agency organization, procedure, or practice.”8  Since the Freedom of Information Act was first
enacted in 1966, Section 552(a)(2) has provided that “a final order, opinion, statement of policy,
interpretation, or staff manual or instruction that affects a member of the public may be relied
upon, used, or cited as precedent by an agency against a party other than an agency only if” it has
been published and indexed as the statute provides, or the party has had actual and timely notice
of it.  The Congress that enacted this language was aware of the importance of publication rule
practice, and chose only the requirement of publication as its legislative response; putting an end
to secret law, not additional proceduralization, was its aim.9
DRAFT.  All rights reserved.
Not for citation, quotation or further distribution without the author’s written consent.
[unamended APA] these Federal agency decisions have been kept secret from the members of the public
affected by the decisions.
... This law is embodied in thousands of orders, opinions, statements, and instructions issued by hundreds
of agencies.  This is the material which would be made available ... .  However, ... an agency may not be
required to make available ... any advisory interpretation on a specific set of facts which is requested by and
addressed to a particular person, provided that such interpretation is not cited or relied upon by any officer
or employee of the agency as a precedent in the disposition of other cases. ...
Subsection (b) would help bring order out of the confusion of agency orders, opinions, policy statements,
interpretations, manuals, and instructions by requiring each agency to maintain for public inspection an
index of all the documents having precedential significance ... . ...  as an incentive to establish an effective
indexing system, ... no agency action may be relied upon, used, or cited as a precedent against a private
party unless it is indexed or unless the private party has adequate notice of the terms of the agency order.
H.Rep. 89-1497, reprinted in West CCAN, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. at 2418, 2424-25 (1966).  No controversy appears respecting the
language of the Senate bill, which had previously been adopted by the Senate and was adopted without amendment by the
House.
10   CNI v.  Young, 818 F.2d 943 (D.C.Cir.  1987), discussed in Richard Thomas, Prosecutorial Discretion and
Agency Self-Regulation: CNI v.  Young and the Aflatoxin Dance, 44 Admin.L.Rev.  13 (1992); Chamber of Commerce v.  US
Department of Labor, 174 F.3d 206 (1999), discussed in Theresa Titolo, The Aftermath of Chamber of Commerce v.  United
States Department of Labor and Its Implications for OSHA Reform, manuscript on file with author.
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Just as the D.C. Circuit encrusted notice and comment rulemaking procedures with judicial
“innovations” before the Vermont Yankee opinion emphasized its obligation to respect the deci-
sions made by Section 553, in recent years that court – seeing only those cases citizens have cared
to litigate about – has repeatedly required increasing formalization of  publication rulemaking, and
done so without any attention to the provisions of Section 552(a).  Cases in that circuit now
require the use of notice and comment rulemaking to set enforcement policy, if knowledge of that
policy might be expected inevitably to shape private conduct.10  Other cases reason that once an
agency has used a publication rule to interpret its regulations, any further, differing interpretation
may be adopted only by the use of notice-and-comment rulemaking; and the most recent of these
cases gives this formality-triggering characteristic to action that had been taken by staff in one
DRAFT  All rights reserved.
Not for citation, quotation or further distribution without the author’s written consent.
11   Paralyzed Veterans of America v.  D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir.  1997) and Alaska Professional
Hunters Assn v.  FAA, 177 F.3d 1030 (D.C. Cir.  1999), discussed in Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules
From Interpretative Rules, 52 Admin.L.Rev. 547, 574 (2000) and Jon Connolly, Alaska Hunters and the D.C. Circuit: A
Defense of Flexible Interpretive Rulemaking, 101 Colum.L.Rev.155 (2001).  A different, and less problematic, proposition is
that where a regulation has embodied the interpretation of a statute, an agency can change that statutory interpretation only by
amending the regulation – by further notice-and-comment rulemaking, and not by issuing an interpretive rule concerning the
regulation.  National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Assn v.  Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir.  1992).
12   Appalachian Power Co.  v.  EPA, 208 F.3d 1015 (DC Cir.  2000).  See n. 64 within.
13   Concrete measures of the phenomenon are hard to come by, though claims that the temptation is being yielded to
are frequent.  See, e.g., n. 64 within.  For one thoughtful effort at measurement, see Todd Rakoff, n. 33 within, 52
Admin.L.Rev. at 168.
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distant region, with the consequence of forbidding the agency's central administration from ever
itself issuing an interpretive rule.11  Yet another case appears to go out of its way to denounce the
practice of using publication rules, as if such rules were characteristic of lawless agency maneu-
vering.12  
It is not hard to find considerations supporting the outcomes of these decisions.  Private par-
ties may have acted in reliance on an understanding about the state of the law, which a publication
rule subsequently undercut.   The notorious ossification of notice-and-comment rulemaking in
recent years, a response to the minority of regulations having major economic impact, has greatly
increased the cost of notice-and-comment rulemaking at the same time as agencies have experi-
enced increasing stringency in the resources available to them.  The more costly it becomes to
generate regulations, and the fewer resources agencies have available to pay those costs, the
greater will be the temptation to find other means to generate policy – shortcutting a desirable,
even necessary public process.13   The contested cases sometimes appear to result from clumsy
lawyering or overreaching claims in court on agencies’ part.  If an agency has instructed its in-
DRAFT.  All rights reserved.
Not for citation, quotation or further distribution without the author’s written consent.
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spectors to file complaints when they find certain precise factual conditions that agency higher-
ups have concluded signal a violation of a standard embodied in its regulations, inspectors may
carelessly allege the existence of the factual conditions, rather than a violation of the standard, as
the basis on which they seek a fine.  The proliferation of rules seeming to require courts to accept
agency interpretations as binding upon them may encourage agency lawyers to claim more defer-
ential ground for their client when these interpretations are challenged in court than they wisely
should.
Without wishing to deny that these forces are at work, this paper draws its orientation from
the explicit provisions of the APA, and from the proposition that the precedential force it permits
interpretive and policy documents is grounded in sound policy considerations.  Agency adminis-
tration is aided when central officials can advise responsible bureaucrats how they should apply
agency law.  Citizens are better off if they can know about these instructions and rely on agency
positions, with the assurance of equal treatment such central advice permits, than if they are remit-
ted to the discretion of local agents and to “secret law.”  Particularly in a society that has come to
believe standards are a better instrument of regulation than detailed command-and-control rules,
even an ideal level of rulemaking will generate an enormous range of issues on which interpreta-
tion and policy will be required.  These are the predominant occasions for publication rulemaking,
and the resulting publication rules very rarely reach the courts.   
In discouraging their use or making it more expensive, the judicial responses threaten impor-
DRAFT  All rights reserved.
Not for citation, quotation or further distribution without the author’s written consent.
14   H.Rep. 89-1497, reprinted in West CCAN, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. at 2418, 2424-25 (1966).
15   See National Family Planning, n.11 above.
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tant sources of information for citizens and important encouragements to agency regularity and
even-handedness.  As the House Committee remarked on reporting what is now §552(a)(2) to the
floor, 
... This material is the end product of Federal administration.  It has the force and effect of
law in most cases ... embodied in thousands of orders, opinions, statements, and instruc-
tions issued by hundreds of agencies. ... Subsection (b) would help bring order out of the
confusion of agency orders, opinions, policy statements, interpretations, manuals, and in-
structions by requiring each agency to maintain for public inspection an index of all the
documents having precedential significance ... . ... [A]s an incentive to establish an effec-
tive indexing system, ... no agency action may be relied upon, used, or cited as a precedent
against a private party unless it is indexed or unless the private party has adequate notice
of the terms of the agency order.14 
Changed approaches, moreover, are particularly likely after the inauguration of a new President,
who will believe he has won a mandate to use executive power in a manner different from his
predecessor.  Unless the prior interpretations were put in place by regulation,15 characterizing
these changes as lawless maneuvering begs important questions about what a change in adminis-
tration means; it seems at least contestable whether if President Clinton’s was the first administra-
tion informally to interpret an agency regulation, that fact condemns President George W.  Bush’s
and all succeeding administrations to do their interpreting by notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
These are the premises on which this paper proceeds.  
This topic is hard to write about.  This is, in part, because so many relationships are involved:
DRAFT.  All rights reserved.
Not for citation, quotation or further distribution without the author’s written consent.
16   Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
17   467 U.S. 837 (1984).
18   323 U.S. 134 (1944).
19    ___ U.S. ___ (2000).
20   325 U.S. 410 (1945).
21   508 U.S. 38 (1993).  Another standard reference is Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
22   E.g., Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996).
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the legislature, the courts, an agency, within the agency its various staff offices, and citizens sub-
ject to agency action.  Within each of these relationships lie possibilities both of control and of
influence, that we must explore.  Difficulties also arise out of doctrinal considerations: issues of
reviewability – finality and ripeness – need to be kept distinct from questions about required pro-
cedure, and these in turn differ from the issue what standards of review are appropriate.  Within
the framework of the standard of review question lurk issues about whether executive decisions
respecting enforcement are reviewable at all,16 knotty problems of government estoppel and agen-
cy non-acquiescence, the application and meaning of the Supreme Court’s protean decision in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.  v.  Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,17 the Court’s recent revival
of attention to Skidmore v.  Swift & Co.18 in Christensen v.  Harris County,19  the Chevron-ana-
logs for reviewing agency interpretations of regulations, Bowles v.  Seminole Rock & Sand Co.20
and Stinson v.  United States,21 and the Court’s usual insistence, respecting statutes, that once it
has spoken on an interpretive question, the result can be changed only by statute.22 
The analytic tools commentators employ can also be misleading.  The anthropomorphic ten-
DRAFT  All rights reserved.
Not for citation, quotation or further distribution without the author’s written consent.
23   In a widely publicized recent brouhaha, an OSHA official responded by letter (two years late) to an inquiry
whether employers would be responsible for dangerous conditions in workers’ homes, if they had their employees work at
home.  He indicated a view that they would.  Subsequently this letter was made generally available by posting on the OSHA
web site.  It was found there by another employer, who caused an eruption of congressional and public criticism that led to the
withdrawal of the letter, and its eventual replacement by the opposite interpretation, now with the imprimatur of not only
OSHA’s Administrator but also the Secretary of the Department of Labor.
From a certain perspective, this is a success story about the use of publication rules.  It would be unreasonable to
think the first moves acts of “the agency” in a strongly descriptive sense.  The subsequent developments indicated both the
availability of internal review and its effectiveness in a case of significant controversy.  That the agency was willing to provide
advice, that advice to individuals constituted a step distinct from advice to the public at large, and that advice to the public
could be taken up the chain of command for effective review, all seem highly desirable features.  Worlds without advice, or
without distinctions as to the seriousness and breadth with which it is offered, or without internal checks on its accuracy, would
seem quite a bit less desirable.
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dency to treat agencies as if they were a single human actor is particularly distracting and distort-
ing when one is analyzing a medium that the constituent elements of complex institutions use to
speak to each other.23  Moreover, discussion sometimes proceeds as if the issue to be examined is
whether agency actions are “binding” or not – as if there were only two choices.  The APA, how-
ever, describes the permitted legal force of agency actions in three ways: actions validly adopted
pursuant to congressionally authorized rulemaking procedures have the kind of authority we
commonly ascribe to statutes; actions that meet the publication requirements of Section 552(a)
have such authority as we commonly ascribe to precedents; and in other cases, agencies are not
permitted to treat their actions as having legal force on citizens.    Echoing Skidmore, the recent
Christensen decision similarly reminds us that there are in fact three possibilities – not only con-
trol and irrelevance, but also influence.  Keeping in mind the statutory recognition of influence, of
precedential force, considerably aids analysis.
A recent student analysis of one of the recent DC Circuit cases remarked on an ongoing ten-
DRAFT.  All rights reserved.
Not for citation, quotation or further distribution without the author’s written consent.
24   Connolly, n. 11 above, citing to the same effect Thomas, n.10 above.
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sion between the Supreme Court and that court, as both have 
“struggled to balance some measure of restraint and accountability with efficiency in defin-
ing the proper power and scope of agency rulemaking. ... [T]he Supreme Court has in-
creasingly moved towards a more ‘hands off’ approach, trusting the political process to
ensure agency fairness, the D.C. Circuit has maintained a much more skeptical stance
toward agency discretion.”24
Almost a quarter century ago, the Supreme Court spoke to that tension in  Vermont Yankee,
forbidding that court from overriding the procedural instructions of the APA’s specification of
notice-and-comment procedure for rulemaking.  If we could imagine a similar outcome grounded
in the APA’s express recognition that agencies are permitted to rely upon their publication rules,
what might that instruction look like?  The pages following suggest the following as a set of
principles whose observance could avoid what is now a considerable threat to one of the major
protections administrative law offers against arbitrary government:
Section 552 permits agencies to give publication rules precedential effect, reflecting the
values both of effective supervision of the bureaucracy and of providing reliable notice to
the public of agency policies and understandings.
Centrally generated publication rules likely significantly to affect private conduct are ordi-
narily ‘final agency action” subject, if ripe, to judicial review.
In reviewing a publication rule, courts need give only Skidmore deference to an agency’s
determination that its existing statutes and regulations authorize that rule.
In making the determination whether an agency’s existing statutes and regulations autho-
rize a publication rule, a court may consider whether the agency’s regulations fail to artic-
ulate important policy conclusions it could reasonably have been expected to reach.  Any
DRAFT  All rights reserved.
Not for citation, quotation or further distribution without the author’s written consent.
     25  82 F.3d 165 (7th Cir. 1996).
     26 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a).
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conclusion that an agency’s regulations are insufficiently specific in some particular, how-
ever, must be made in the context of the agency’s array of statutes and regulations as a
whole, and the predictable importance of that particular to the agency and those it regu-
lates in the context of its general responsibilities.
Agencies may freely revise publication rules, subject to the usual constraint of having to
justify changes in policy.
I.  A Framing Case: Hoctor v. Department of Agriculture25
The relatively simple facts of Hoctor v. US Department of Agriculture can help to frame the
discussion.  Hoctor had a game farm near Terre Haute Indiana, where he raised lions, tigers, and
other big cats.  The Animal Welfare Act of 1966 required the licensing of his operations by the
Department of Agriculture.  That Act authorized the Secretary "to promulgate such rules, regula-
tions, and orders as he may deem necessary in order to effectuate the purposes of [the Act]," 
standards "to govern the humane handling, care, treatment, and transportation of animals by
dealers."  These standards must include minimum requirements "for handling, housing, feeding,
watering, sanitation," etc.26  The Department has adopted many regulations over the years –
sometimes quite detailed, as in the case of dogs, cats, hamsters and the like; but for less com-
monly raised and exhibited animals like Hoctor’s, it produced more general standards.  For exam-
ple 9 C.F.R. 3.125(a), which governs the required structures for housing those animals, provides
DRAFT.  All rights reserved.
Not for citation, quotation or further distribution without the author’s written consent.
27   The assumption here, as in Hoctor, is that the Secretary was authorized to adopt containment rules to protect the
surrounding environment from the animals being contained, as well as vice versa.  As Judge Posner intimated, one could
question whether an “Animal Welfare Act” in fact authorizes such rules.
     28 93 Yale L.J. 65 (1983).
29  Considerations of equal protection or due process arguably govern the precision required of standards,
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The facility must be constructed of such material and of such strength as appropri-
ate for the animals involved. The indoor and outdoor housing facilities shall be
structurally sound and shall be maintained in good repair to protect the animals
from injury and to contain the animals.
Plainly this doesn’t tell Hoctor exactly what to do – how high, for example, to build a perimeter
fence around his property that will keep his lions and tigers out of the surrounding schoolyards
and cattle lots.  It only tells him what tests he will have to meet, and if he wants more detailed
information he will have to get it elsewhere.27
Subject to vagueness concerns, this characteristic is not a failing of the regulation, but an
asset.  The difference between rules and standards is commonplace in the literature, and the bur-
den of discussion now is that standards are preferable.  Almost twenty years ago, Colin Diver
wrote a magisterial article with an evocative title, “The Optimal Precision of Administrative
Rules.”28  That title nicely fits a theme of recent writings about regulatory reform – that detailed,
central, top-down command structures, in which Washington bureaucrats tell citizens exactly how
to build a ladder or in other ways order their lives, have proved ineffective and inefficient.  The
better way is to set a standard that the citizen is obliged to meet, and to leave it to the ingenuity of
the citizen to decide exactly how to do so.  Of course, it could be a better standard;29 the Depart-
DRAFT  All rights reserved.
Not for citation, quotation or further distribution without the author’s written consent.
as for example judicial standards for assessing the clear intent of a voter.  See Bush v. Gore,    U.S.     (Dec. 12,
2000); John Manning, note 70 within, 96 Colum.L.Rev. at  669-70.
30Cf. John Manning, n. 70 within, at 669-70 and n. 281, citing cases.
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ment might, for example, have added
A structure is in violation of this rule if found insufficient to prevent escape by an
average animal of the species contained therein.
By saying more about the performance being required, that would make it easier to identify a
violation, but it would still be a standard, not a rule.  
Essential to this discussion is the proposition that, despite this characteristic, Section
3.125(a) is a valid regulation, and, at least unless its standard is so vague as to leave ordinary
persons at sea about what is being required of them, the Department may sanction people it finds
to have violated it.30  To preclude the Department’s approach, to require it to enact species-spe-
cific detail, would be to reject, pro tanto, the preference for standards.  It might also be to inflict
an unsustainable expectation of foresight or detail on agency rulemakers – as if they must antici-
pate just what animals are to be contained, what range of physical characteristic each possesses,
and the like, all information much more readily at hand to (and properly demanded of) their keep-
ers than of the Department’s central bureaus.  In worlds of regulation intensely more technologi-
cal and safety-concerned than the Department’s supervision of wild animal farms – say, nuclear
power plant regulation, or airframe approval – the regulations for which the politically account-
able leadership is responsible consistently frame standards, which are then elaborated in detail by
DRAFT.  All rights reserved.
Not for citation, quotation or further distribution without the author’s written consent.
Interpretive rules.wpd, draft of March 9, 2001   Page 16 of 67
regulatory guidance documents generated by engineering staffs, usually after informal exchanges
with the regulated industry.  It is not, then, a proper complaint about the Department of Agricul-
ture’s performance that its regulations failed in terms to require eight foot perimeter fences for big
cats, rather than require a “facility ... constructed of such material and of such strength as appro-
priate for the animals involved ... structurally sound and ... maintained in good repair to protect
the animals from injury and to contain the animals.”
Still, it will be helpful to the Hoctors of this world, and to the inspectors who patrol their
compliance with rules like these, if safe harbors can be defined.  From an agency perspective,
uniformity of administration nationwide is a good, and it may doubt whether its pool of not-so-
well-paid inspectors will be able to handle so much discretion.  Adopting regulations would re-
quire the time of the agency’s limited top-level management and costly formality to create or alter. 
If the top of the agency’s hierarchy is not the place for generating species-by-species, cage-and-
fence detail, nonetheless a central, responsible staff office may be.  Having regulations that set
standards virtually requires the emergence of advice to tell game park owners and departmental
inspectors alike what kind of fence will be regarded as “structurally sound” to contain lions and
tigers.  Periodic advice from a responsible staff office can provide those who are disposed to
cooperate with regulation with a framework for achieving compliance efficiently and confidently. 
It can create a framework for staff advice and enforcement that enhances both the agency’s inter-
nal discipline, and the regularity and equal treatment citizens experience. 
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In light of APA Section 552(a), this advice can take a variety of forms.  One can imagine
five different ways in which Hoctor might have discovered the Department’s specific judgment:
1) He might have found an interpretive rule stating that “facilities ... structurally sound ...
to contain the animals,” requires, for big cats, an eight foot perimeter fence.
2) He might have found a policy document announcing that the Department had decided
on the basis of recent studies and literature to seek fines and other sanctions against li-
censed dealers whose facilities for big cats lacked eight foot perimeter fences.
3) He might have found an inspectors’ manual directing the Department’s inspectors to
accept eight foot perimeter fences as complying with the regulation, and/or to issue cita-
tions to dealers with lower or absent perimeter fences.
4) He might have found prior administrative adjudications deciding that the structural
standard was met by eight foot perimeter fences but not by seven foot perimeter fences.
5) When seeking his license, he might have asked a local Department veterinarian, lacking
further guidance from above, what height of perimeter fence would meet the regulation.
Note that  this paper, here as elsewhere, treats all publication rules alike.  Section 552(a)
does not distinguish among interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or staff manuals (or,
for that matter, agency adjudicative precedent) in its diction.  The D.C. Circuit31 and some com-
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mentators have devoted considerable effort to distinguishing among these forms.32  Rather than
distinguish among the forms, this paper prefers to distinguish between two different settings in
which agencies may try to use any of them: in the first setting, the publication rule purports to
draw on some existing source of agency legal authority, statute and/or regulation; in the second, it
does not.  Todd Rakoff has persuasively characterized the difference between American and
Japanese informal procedure as being, precisely, that Japanese administrative law contemplates
legitimate informal agency action, what the Japanese term “guidance,” that is concededly beyond
the reach of direct statutory or regulatory requirements, while American administrative law does
not.33  As reflected throughout this paper,34 the question of authority is central to the analysis
being offered.  Nothing said here should be taken to suggest that a publication rule can have the
influence permitted by Section 552(a), in the absence of some such relationship to a superior
norm.  Whichever form it takes, its permitted influence depends on its reasonable relationship to
requirements enunciated in statute or regulation, which the publication rule serves to make more
concrete in particular circumstances.
This defining characteristic also eliminates any need here to plumb the issues of definition
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that have plagued some discussions.35  Regulations can only be made by using notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking or qualifying for one of the exceptions to Section 553 of the APA that permit
agencies to claim the force of statutes for their rules even if those procedures have not been used. 
Nothing in the APA permits an agency to claim legislative force for a publication rule.  If an agen-
cy wishes to claim that force for a rule, Section 552 is simply beside the point.  If it does not claim
that force for a rule, if it simply asserts that it may rely on its previously announced rule in deal-
ings with citizens premised on authority or regulatory commands elsewhere grounded, then Sec-
tion 553 is irrelevant.  It may well be that such announcements will contribute to significant chan-
ges in private conduct; but if it is not the announcement itself that the agency relies upon should it
attempt to command those changes, the fact of such reliance is no more than Section 552 antici-
pates.  A bit more care from agency counsel about the precise source of authority an agency is
claiming, within the agency and, especially, when judicial review is sought, could work wonders.36
As Judge Posner reported the facts, Hoctor in fact chose the fifth of the routes listed
above – the one that will prevail when an agency has not used publication rules, and consequently
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the one that leaves matters to the discretion of an uninstructed street-level bureaucrat.  In 1982,
an inspecting Department veterinarian told Hoctor that to get a license he would have to build a
six foot perimeter fence around his whole property, in addition to pens for the big cats and a
containment fence around their immediate area.  Hoctor built all of these, and was licensed.  In
1983, the following year, the Department added a provision to the manual it uses to instruct its
inspectors, telling them to apply an eight-foot standard for perimeter fences for dangerous animals
under its containment standard.  It was not until seven years later, in 1990, that 
Hoctor was cited by a Department of Agriculture inspector for violating ... the
housing standard, by failing to have an eight-foot perimeter fence.   Eventually the
Department sanctioned Hoctor for this and other alleged violations, and he ...
sought judicial review limited ... to the perimeter fence. ...  
Although Judge Posner did not address it specifically, this element of reliance on local official
advice in making an expensive investment complicates the analysis, and in my judgment tends to
explain the cases fairly well.  This turns out to be another of those contexts in which courts have
struggled to free citizens from the death grip of the rule that the government cannot be estopped
by the errors of its agents.  But for the moment it will be useful to focus on the first four of these
possibilities – interpretive rules, statements of general policy, staff manuals, and decisions in adju-
dicated cases – by which the Department’s view might be elucidated.
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II.  Finality and Ripeness
Judge Posner did not have to consider the reviewability of the manual provision at issue in
Hoctor, because the case before him involved a concrete application of the understanding re-
flected there to impose a fine on a citizen.  If the Department had given excessive jural force to its
manual provision, treating it as if it were a regulation, the order imposing that fine – undoubtedly
both final agency action and ripe for review – should be reversed.  In other cases, however, citi-
zens or the regulated may wish to challenge the validity of a publication rule in advance of its
concrete application.  As in the case of a regulation, in some circumstances conformity may be so
simple and the consequences of disregarding a publication rule that would be upheld may be so
severe, as to make those who learn of a publication rule unwilling to take the risk of its concrete
application to them.  Unless able to challenge it in advance of its application, that is, they will
follow the course it requires, and its validity will never be assessed.  In other circumstances, those
who are the objects of regulation may welcome a publication rule, that members of the public
believe inadequately protective of their interests; again, because the regulated will comply, there
will never be a concrete application of the rule that could be tested on judicial review.  This, for
example, was the setting in CNI v. Young,37 where the FDA had issued enforcement guidelines
setting a tolerance level for aflatoxin, a naturally occurring carcinogen unavoidably associated to
some degree with corn; the guideline instructed its inspectors not to interfere with corn shipments
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having a lower aflatoxin level.  This created a safe harbor grain merchants warmly desired; but the
Community Nutrition Institute believed that the harbor was in fact not safe for the corn-consum-
ing public, and successfully challenged its adoption as a publication rule rather than a regulation.
The reader may already have grasped that permitting review of publication rules prior to
their application presents all the considerations associated with the Supreme Court’s opinion,
increasingly controversial in some quarters, in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner.38  Similarly, per-
mitting review at the behest of those not subject to the rule raises ripeness controversies parallel
to those that have sharply divided the Supreme Court and commentators in other settings in re-
cent years.39  This is not the place to explore those controversies as they arise in the context of
regulations produced by notice and comment rulemaking procedures.  It is, however, necessary to
address some additional considerations that can be adduced concerning publication rules.  In
addition to the arguments against the pre-application reviewability of regulations may be mar-
shaled, also, the structural contingency of any publication rule.  Unlike a regulation, which enjoys
statutory effect and can be altered only by the relatively formal procedures of notice-and-comment
rulemaking, a publication rule is merely influential; it can be freely altered at any point before it
has been concretely applied – and, indeed, the agency issuing it must be prepared to treat it as
provisional, in the sense that it must permit arguments for its alteration to be made in any pro-
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ceeding to apply it.  Whether, then, it is properly regarded as a “final agency action” is a more
difficult question than appeared in Abbott Laboratories.  
Important to the resolution of that question, moreover, are two additional considerations
that tend to defeat conclusions for reviewability.  First, and associated with the contingency of a
publication rule’s proposition, would be understandings about the value, volume, and provenance
of many such rules.  Knowledge of an agency’s interpretations, policies, etc., is a positive good,
and voluntary agency creation of publication rules therefore ought not be discouraged – as the
prospect of easy review might tend to do.  Given the volume at which publication rules appear
relative to regulations, moreover, it is likely that most if not all will be generated at agency staff
levels that make ascribing “finality” to them questionable within the agency’s own hierarchy; high-
er officials, that is, will rarely have had any occasion to consider and ratify the merits of the posi-
tions taken.  Second is the frequent association of publication rules with questions of enforcement
policy.  Decisions about the allocation of agency resources and effort – viz., what concentration
of an inevitable carcinogen in corn should lead agency inspectors to condemn a shipment as con-
taminated – are among the most frequent subjects of publication rules; and, the Supreme Court
has said, judgments of that character are presumptively unreviewable, given the mischief second-
ary disputes about why an agency is doing this, rather than that, could wreak.40  Agency resources
are already scarce, inevitably requiring such allocations; permitting judicial review of them con-
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sumes more of those resources, and may delay other work.
Considerations like these animated Judge Leventhal’s decision in National Automatic
Laundry and Cleaning Council, already briefly discussed.41  The advisory letters in that case were
interpretative rules, he concluded; the question he had to decide was whether the letter before him
was “final agency action” ripe for review.  On the one hand, it was important not to “discourage
the practice of giving such opinions, with a net loss of far greater proportions to the average
citizen than any possible gain which could accrue” through making all such advice reviewable; on
the other hand, the 10,000 signed by the administrator and  “published” had a prominence that lay
within the agency’s control, they were adopted at the highest levels in the agency, and the possi-
bilities for private enforcement of the act practically bound the inquirer and others to pay attention
to their terms.  Unless the agency credibly branded its advice as “tentative,” then, advice given at
the agency’s head – that is, the 10,000 letters she signed – would qualify as “final agency action”
subject to judicial review. 
National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council remains one of the more thoughtful
and balanced opinions written on the tensions animating publication rules questions – one of the
very few to explore the dimensions of the practice, and the practical consequences of that practice
not only for the party who may be complaining in a particular case, but also for the public gener-
ally in its dealings with the agency.  The DC Circuit’s very recent opinion in Appalachian Pow-
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er,42 though less temperate or understanding in its diction about the practice,43 reaches the same
result on the question of finality and ripeness, under factual circumstances that seem comparable. 
EPA’s publication rule in that case, produced in the upper echelons of the agency, spoke to state
authorities; it could be expected to make them act in ways that would have expensive impacts on
private industry, yet could not realistically be challenged at a later stage.  “[W]hatever EPA may
think of its Guidance generally, the elements ... petitioners challenge consist of the agency’s set-
tled position, a position it plans to follow in reviewing State-issued permits, a position it will insist
State and local authorities comply with in setting the terms and conditions of permits issued to
petitioners, a position EPA officials in the field are bound to apply.”44  Neither temporary nor
interlocutory, the publication rule “reflect[s] a settled agency position which has legal conse-
quences both for State agencies administering their permit programs and for companies ... who
must obtain Title V permits in order to keep operating.”45  
Balanced against the risks that permitting review inevitably raises – the risks animating
Justice Fortas’s dissent in Abbott Laboratories and, in some cases, those of Heckler v. Chaney as
well – are two factors that, if both are strongly present, warrant review nonetheless.  The first is
demonstrable and important concrete impact on private behavior.  If citizens facing firmly held
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agency views are likely to modify their conduct in ways expensive to them rather than face the
consequences of having those views applied to them, as in Abbott, review will be available only in
conjunction with the agency’s adoption of its publication rule.  Our system’s general commitment
to the justice of providing avenues of declaratory judicial relief in such circumstances supports a
similar conclusion here.  The second factor might be described as agency control.  Reviewability is
in effect a price the agency pays for giving prominence and concreteness to its publication rules. 
When a central agency office publishes notice that it is considering a matter and, after some ex-
changes with affected parties, then publishes its conclusions under the imprimatur of high officials
and with indications that it expects to hold the public to its policy, the argument for review is
strong; so also when it chooses 10,000 of 750,000 letters of advice to receive the administrator’s
signature.  When advice emerges from staff, when – even if published – the public can be ex-
pected to realize that top agency levels have not yet fully considered the matter, or when the
publication rule itself is framed in a manner that indicates that issues remain open and administra-
tive avenues remain available to pursue them, then one cannot conclude that agency action is final. 
Permitting review in such circumstances would threaten both a diversion of agency resources,
perhaps into forcing final judgment about this question at a time when other issues have more
important claims on agency resources, and work to discourage the practice of providing guidance
at all.  If the agency can in effect be given control over whether review is available or not, by
having that question turn on its signals, this question of discouragement should be substantially
resolved.
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In Hudson v.  FAA,46 the D.C. Circuit faced a challenge to the FAA’s changed policy for
applying a regulation setting a safety standard for air frames; the standard required manufacturers
to show that, for planes of a certain size, all passengers could be evacuated through emergency
exits within ninety seconds, and further provided that “compliance with this requirement must be
shown by actual demonstration ... unless the Administrator finds that a combination of analysis
and testing will provide [equivalent] data ... .”  For about twenty years, published FAA guidance
required retesting of changed designs through actual demonstration if the change enlarged passen-
ger capacity by more than five percent.  New guidance was issued in 1998, after restudy prompted
by injuries occurring during the resulting testing, dropping the five percent rule and making the
adequacy of analytic data a question in each case; the guidance document also announced the
FAA’s confidence that for two particular airframe expansions for which approval was then being
sought “a wealth of full-scale evacuation data are available” and thus “conduct of additional full-
scale evacuation demonstrations is not required to demonstrate compliance, if a satisfactory analy-
sis is produced.”47  In what the panel characterized as “a rather unorthodox manner,” but one that
in the writer’s experience is often employed and commenters have strongly urged,48 the FAA
sought public comment on this change.  Eventually, it found the air frames in question in compli-
ance with its evacuation standard, on the basis only of data and analysis; and various persons who
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expected to have to travel in these planes then sought review, asserting, inter alia, that the policy
change could be effected only by notice and comment procedure.
Because it was able to characterize the guidance document as a “general policy statement”
rather than an interpretive rule, the panel was able to avoid circuit precedent precluding agencies
from changing interpretations, once established, without engaging in notice and comment
rulemaking;49 and on the substance of the matter, it found the guidance adequately supported. 
Before reaching these questions, however, it had to consider whether review had been timely
sought, since petitioners had awaited and challenged concrete application of the guidance rather
than seek review within 60 days of its issuance (as they would apparently have been obliged to do
if asserting the procedural insufficiency of a regulation).  Apparently, then, the government was
arguing that the guidance document did constitute final agency action that would have been ripe
for immediate review.  One might think this a curious appearance of the sometime tendency of
lawyers to argue whatever makes it more likely their client will prevail; arguments against the
finality and/or ripeness of publication rules seem likely more often to appear from the govern-
ment’s quiver.  The panel easily found that, given the announcement in the guidance document of
the pending approval proceedings in which the new approach might be applied, “we would likely
have regarded petitioner’s APA challenge as premature if it had been brought before the issuance
of the certificate, and so we do not agree that petitioners’ subsequent challenge is too late.”50 
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Implicit in the whole discussion, however, is that for publication rules unmistakably representing
an agency’s considered view and directly affecting citizen interests,  the proper issue will much
more often be ripeness than finality.
III. Chevron Obedience and Skidmore Weight
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Christensen v.  Harris County51 focused some
attention on how one might articulate the way in which agency judgments on matters of law or
policy should influence reviewing courts.  Putting aside the possibility of treating agency views as
simply irrelevant, two models live in the cases.  These might be described as either “obedience” –
courts encountering agency decisions they conclude the agencies were authorized to take must
accept the conclusions they embody rather than displace them with their own independent judg-
ment on the matter – or “weight” – the court is responsible for decision of a matter, but in decid-
ing it will treat the agency views as constituent elements of its own decision, as persuasive if not
controlling material whose force derives from the agency’s office and the dignity of its action. 
The “obedience” model is firmly associated in the Court’s canon with its decision in Chevron
USA, Inc.  v.  Natural Resources Defense Council52 that within the possibilities of meaning a
statute’s language could be given, a matter for the courts to decide, a reviewing court must accept
any reasonable interpretation given that language by the agency Congress has empowered to
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implement the statute.    The “weight” model was best articulated by Justice Robert Jackson in
Skidmore v.  Swift & Co.;53 this was private litigation to enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act, in
which the authority of interpretive advice given by the Administrator of the relevant division in the
Department of Labor had been invoked:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator
under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority,
do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance.  The weight of such a judgment in a
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.
Christensen, which arose in precisely the same context as Skidmore, held that Skidmore weight
rather than Chevron obedience remained the correct measure of the force of agency upon judicial
interpretation of text, where the agency interpretation was expressed in a publication rule.
The tendency of government lawyers to argue for more than perhaps they advisedly 
should may be nowhere more evident than in their arguments, especially post-Chevron, that publi-
cation rules have the same authority for reviewing courts as do statutes or regulations interpreting
statutes – that once a court has found a publication rule authorized, it is bound to accept it.  Sec-
tion 552(a)(2), however, suggests a different way of understanding the force of publication rules. 
It treats agencies as permitted to give publication rules in any form the force of precedent, rather
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than statute.54  It does so in two ways: first, it lists them together with agency precedent, as if
each of them had equal dignity.  Second, it describes the permitted effect the agency may give its
published precedents or interpretive rules, policy statements, manuals, and the like in a way that
sounds like the treatment of precedent: “A final order, opinion, statement of policy, interpretation,
or staff manual or instruction that affects a member of the public may be relied upon, used, or
cited as precedent by an agency against a party other than an agency only if” it has been published
as the statute provides, or the party had actual and timely notice of it.   The question for explora-
tion here, in my judgment, is whether it is possible to distinguish this permitted precedential effect
– permission to the agency to rely on its published position to the disadvantage of a party – from
what we mean when we say that an agency judgment binds another – a private party, or a court. 
The analysis here rests on fundamental agreement with a principal element in the scholar-
ship of Robert Anthony on this subject.55  He started his scholarship on this subject thirteen years
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ago with Chevron, whose fundamental proposition is that, on some issues and within the zone of
reasonableness, courts are significantly bound by – obliged to accept without the possibility of
revising – agency judgments about legal issues that statutory language leaves open.56  Ronald Le-
vin’s recent work has persuasively shown that one necessary condition of such judgments is that
they be able to survive Overton Park/State Farm review.57  Another necessary condition, and this
is Prof.  Anthony’s’s assertion, is that they be the product of a delegated lawmaking process –
whether formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.  If they constitute, simply, inter-
pretive rules or statements of general policy, or a course of precedent developed through informal
means, then – here we are at Christensen – a reviewing court may find it appropriate to give them
some weight, the code name is Skidmore deference, but should not say that it was “bound” by the
agency’s view.  Whatever judgment is exercised, that is, is the reviewing court’s judgment –
informed to whatever extent the circumstances warrant by the agency’s developed view.
Putting it this way should suggest that what is being invoked is the common law model of
balancing.  “Weight,” like “balancing,” metaphorically suggests the scales of justice, but few
pretend to any very precise account of what goes on those scales.  One has “more” or “less,”
rather than “5” or “8.2.”  Discussions of common law technique for dealing with analogy, or
evaluating the law of different (but perhaps influential) jurisdictions produce evocative formula-
tions.  Justice Frankfurter argued in a variety of contexts that the absence of “a calculus of value,”
DRAFT  All rights reserved.
Not for citation, quotation or further distribution without the author’s written consent.
58   The first two phrases are to be found in Universal Camera Corp.  v.  NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); the third in
Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum.L.Rev.  527, 543 (1947); see also Rochin v.  California?
59   Universal Camera, supra, 340 U.S. at      .
60  See, generally, R. Kent Greenawalt, Reflections on Holding and Dictum, 39 J.Leg.Ed. 431 (1989). 
     61 For a particularly strong statement in the context of statutory interpretation, Neal v. United States.
62   I owe to John Manning the suggestion to compare Salve Regina College v.  Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232-33
(1991)(discussing the basis, in an Erie context, for courts of appeals to respect the knowledgeable views of district judges about
the law of the states from which they are appointed).
Interpretive rules.wpd, draft of March 9, 2001   Page 33 of 67
“talismanic words,” or “a table of logarithms” did not preclude but rather characterized judicial
judgment;58 “it cannot too often be repeated that judges are not automata.  The ultimate reliance
for the fair operation of any standard is a judiciary of high competence and character and the
constant play of an informed professional critique upon its work.”59  Justice Jackson’s Skidmore
formulation self-evidently draws on the same traditions.
Staying for the moment with the court model, we can observe that what we mean when
we say a judicial judgment or rule is “binding” varies considerably with the subject of our
inquiry.60  When we say precedents are binding on lower tribunals, we mean that the lower tribu-
nals are powerless to revise them and subject to summary reversal for ignoring them; in a hierar-
chical system of courts, under a rule of stare decisis, lower tribunals are without discretion to
depart from the norms previously announced by superior authority.61  The equivalent of Skidmore
deference is what courts afford precedents of a coordinate, inferior, or foreign jurisdiction – if and
to the extent they are persuasive, and bearing in mind the affirmative values of uniformity and how
the legislature has assigned responsibility, they will be weighed.62  Courts in the First Department
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of New York’s Appellate Division will pay attention to judgments in the Second Department or
the Second Circuit, assessing their persuasiveness and coherence with other doctrine, but they will
not say that they are “bound” by them.  When a court is regarding the force of its own prior deci-
sions, there is an intermediate ground: the court will depart from them only to the extent the
present controversy was in fact not there decided (the cases can be distinguished) or it can be
persuaded that its earlier judgment was seriously in error (the prior holding is overruled).   While
overruling is always possible, courts will say that it commands a showing considerably stronger
than may have elicited the initial conclusion.63  
Whether administrative agencies will think themselves “bound,” or will be thought by
subsequent reviewing courts to have been “bound” by judicial decisions is a more complex ques-
tion we know as the “nonacquiescence” question.  When the agency has to know that the particu-
lar matter before it will come to the same appellate tribunal as has previously spoken, most
thoughtful observers – and certainly that tribunal – can be expected to say that it is “bound.”  Yet
even this case is somewhat controversial.64  When the reviewing court might be one that has not
yet spoken, the prevailing rule is that the agency is not bound, although it would be well advised
to explain its reasons for refusing to accept the previous judicial instruction it received. 
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Now, still in the court context, how would we talk about the impact of precedent on the
parties to litigation?  Within the case – res judicata, the law of the case – the parties to that litiga-
tion are bound in the strong sense – judgments must be paid, contempt citations are possible.  In
some circumstances, we would expect courts to declare a party collaterally estopped from assert-
ing in one litigation a proposition it had lost in another.  On the whole, this is a proposition about
disputed facts, not law.  For agencies, moreover, it is essentially subsumed into the nonacquies-
cence issue; collateral estoppel, as estoppel generally, is not a powerful idea.  In the stare decisis
context, courts have occasionally voiced the idea that a precedent once established is binding even
on those who were not parties to its generation; but what they seem to have meant is that the
parties ought to have a high degree of confidence that the courts themselves will follow it, under
the discipline of stare decisis, not that negative consequences (like contempt of court citations)
could flow from the very fact of an attempt to contest it.  In a theoretical sense, it is always possi-
ble to argue for the distinguishing or overruling of precedent in the court that set it.  One can find
in the literature elegant discussions of how long such efforts can properly endure before private
litigants should understand that the effort is fruitless and that respect for the system of law re-
quires that they simply comply.  Even these discussions, however, suggest no independent penalty
that would attach to a failure to accept the precedent – as one would, say, to the violation of a
criminal statute – just a strong signal to parties and the lower courts that resistance is unlikely to
be fruitful.  They should be completely confident, that is, that the prior precedents will be the law
applied to their cases even though, in theory, the opportunity of attempting a distinction or seek-
ing an overruling is open to them.  One might note, moreover, that this argument is rather weaker
DRAFT.  All rights reserved.
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if one is speaking of agency rather than judicial precedent; considerations of protecting justified
reliance interests aside, we generally expect and indeed approve fluidity of policy development in
the agency context.  Thus, one could expect agencies to assert considerably greater freedom of
revision than courts think proper in their own practice.
What seems important to note here is that these ideas of legal obligation are a great deal
more nuanced than we generally encounter in the statutory context.  Statutes, if valid, are indis-
putable; and serious consequences attach directly to their violation.  One can argue whether they
are applicable or not; but the adjudicatory forum is not a place where you can argue for their
revision.  That can only happen if the legislature again acts in the constitutionally prescribed man-
ner.  Regulations adopted following statutorily commanded procedures are treated in just the
same way.  While courts entertain disputes about the validity of such regulations much more
readily than they do for statutes, and with much more intrusive inquiry, a valid regulation is equal-
ly indisputable.  It binds court, agency, and private actors alike, and revision can happen only
through further rulemaking.  Serious consequences may attach directly to its violation.  
From a certain perspective this is a stunning result, since it means the courts will accord to
valid executive action the same ultimate authority over their judgment as they do to valid legisla-
tive action.  We are accustomed to thinking of judicial review as having much more purchase over
executive action than legislative.  But on further reflection, it ought not be so surprising.  Where
the greater control of executive action is exercised is in determining its validity.  Here we return
to the ways in which Professors Levin and Anthony understand Chevron.  If the executive has
DRAFT  All rights reserved.
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been authorized to act and has acted within the parameters of its authority – the courts determine
these questions, and  even under Chevron they do so with a lot more attention than they pay to
the corresponding questions for statutes – then we have the valid action of a coordinate branch. 
Why should it, any more than the authorized act of the legislature, be open to judicial revision? 
The judges are bound.  So, we might note, are all agency officials and citizens.  Even before the
agency, citizens might seek a waiver or they might seek an interpretation; but what they cannot
seek, unless in a fresh rulemaking proceeding, is a revision.  They, as the agency, as the court, are
bound.
For interpretive rules, statements of general policy, and the like, on the other hand, the
model Section 552 adopts is that of precedent.  The agency may rely on these publications, which
is not quite the same as saying it is entitled to treat them as binding on the public.  For reviewing
courts, Christensen tells us, echoing Skidmore, the conclusion is the same.  The court exercises its
own judgment, informed in doing so by the conclusions the agency has reached.  What about
lower tiers of authority within the agency – are they bound by the agency’s instructions?  The
model of precedent here suggests a different kind of response; if the source of the published ad-
vice or instruction is hierarchically superior, one could suppose an agency inspector to be in just
the same position as a trial judge reading an appellate opinion.  She is professionally obliged to
obey.  If we approach these difficult questions from the model of “precedent” rather than “stat-
ute,” then, in my judgment we may be able to make some helpful progress in understanding.
When Hoctor was cited for violation, because he kept his tigers behind only a six-foot
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fence, the formal state of affairs was that the agency had to demonstrate that he had not provided
the “structurally sound” containment its regulations validly required.  On a precedential model, we
might say that the fact that the agency had told its inspectors to accept eight foot fences as com-
plying with this standard could be taken to establish, prima facie, that his six-foot fence was a
violation – but that would be a prima facie showing only, and the issue would remain whether
Hoctor was in violation of the “structurally sound” containment requirement.  The case is no
different than if, in some prior adjudication to which Hoctor was not a party and in which another
game park owner appeared without effective counsel, the agency had found that six feet was
inadequate, and eight required.  Hoctor gets to show that, in his case, six feet was enough; or, to
challenge the prior outcome.  Of course this may be costly and difficult to do; for most game park
owners, as for most builders of nuclear power plants, the most cost-effective route may be to go
along with what the staff has identified as a priori acceptable.  In this way, the practical effect of
the staff position may be quite substantial.  Still it is the standard of structural soundness that must
be satisfied; “eight feet” is no better than a provisional definition of what will meet it, and Hoctor
should be free to follow his preferences if he has the confidence of his design.
Note, on this account, that someone may be being bound – not Hoctor, but the agency
inspectorate, those who are down the chain of command from the office issuing this
interpretation-policy-guidance.  Hoctor is being somewhat disadvantaged, to be sure; assuming
§552(a) has been complied with, the agency may rely on its definition in meeting its burden about
structurally sound containment.  But if Hoctor in fact has a well built eight foot fence, we might
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     67  At 167.  Compare with this formulation Judge Randolph’s disapproving characterization in the Appalachian
Power case discussed at p. 25 above:
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expect not just that the agency’s staff will not, but that it cannot,65 seek to fine him for violating
the regulation requiring a structure that is sound for containment purposes until the agency
changes its advice – a change it will need to justify.  Hoctor could complain if an inspector
ignored the advice she found in the agency’s manuals, and that inspector might well find herself
the subject of employment discipline.   Understanding these effects of interpretive rules and
manuals helps us to see why publicity for these documents is so avidly sought, and why it is that
private actors are also assiduous to show that an agency in fact has some such internal “law,”
which has been departed from in their case.66  
As Judge Posner recognized, 
Every governmental agency that enforces a less than crystalline statute must
interpret the statute, and it does the public a favor if it announces the interpretation
in advance of enforcement, whether the announcement takes the form of a rule or
of a policy statement, which the Administrative Procedure Act assimilates to an
interpretive rule.   It would be no favor to the public to discourage the
announcement of agencies' interpretations by burdening the interpretive process
with cumbersome formalities.67
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The phenomenon we see in this case is familiar. Congress passes a broadly worded statute. The
agency follows with regulations containing broad language, open-ended phrases, ambiguous stan-
dards and the like. ... Several words in a regulation may spawn hundreds of pages of text as the
agency offers more and more detail regarding what its regulations demand of regulated entities. 
Law is made, without notice and comment, without public participation, and without publication
in the Federal Register or the Code of Federal Regulations. With the advent of the Internet, the
agency does not need these official publications to ensure widespread circulation; it can inform
those affected simply by posting its new guidance or memoranda or policy statement on its web
site. ...
208 F.3d at 1020.
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This seems particularly apt for interpretations that are primarily directed to the agency’s own staff 
– inspection manuals, for example – with the primary motivation of securing a desirable internal
consistency of action.  The interpretation in Hoctor’s case was embodied in such a manual, a
manual that spoke to the inspector, not to Hoctor.
On this understanding, it would be an error for the Department to charge Hoctor with
violating its eight foot rule.  The agency has not adopted such a rule, and that charge would 
mistake the legal issue to be decided at the sanctions hearing.  Of course, it may be appropriate to
bear in mind the inadequacy, the complexity, of talking about an “agency,” as if it were a
seamless, anthropomorphic entity.  If the inspector’s complaint, that begins an enforcement
proceeding, cites Hoctor for “Fence for tigers six feet high, not eight,” that may be a mistake only
of syntax, one encouraged by the manual that appropriately directs her own conduct.  So long as
Hoctor is permitted to show, before the fine is assessed, that the containment he provided was in
fact structurally sound and adequate to contain his tigers (a showing that might prove difficult if
the precipitating cause of the citation was the presence of one of his tigers in farmer Johnson’s
cattle yard), such a mistake would seem not to have been prejudicial.
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Judges are not always careful to observe the difference between “binding” in precedential
and legislative terms, as may be suggested by a contrasting pair of excerpts – the first from Judge
Posner’s Hoctor opinion, and the second from Judge Randolph’s opinion in Appalachian Power:
Hoctor:  Had the Department ... said in the internal memorandum that it could not
imagine a case in which a perimeter fence for dangerous animals that was lower
than eight feet would provide secure containment, and would therefore presume,
subject to rebuttal, that a lower fence was insecure, it would have been on stronger
ground.   For it would have been tying the rule to the animating standard, that of
secure containment, rather than making it stand free of the standard, self-contain-
ed, unbending, arbitrary. 68
Appalachian Power: If an agency acts as if a document issued at headquarters is
controlling in the field, if it treats the document in the same manner as it treats a
legislative rule, if it bases enforcement actions on the policies or interpretations
formulated in the document, if it leads private parties or State permitting
authorities to believe that it will declare permits invalid unless they comply with the
terms of the document, then the agency's document is for all practical purposes
"binding."69
The Department could properly hope that “a document issued at headquarters [would be regard-
ed by its staff as] controlling in the field” – that is why it is issued.  Similarly, it will hope that –
and the public will be best served if – its staff “bases enforcement actions on the policies or
interpretations formulated in the document.”  And an agency that is reliable in its advice will
inevitably “lead[] private parties or State permitting authorities to believe that it will declare
permits invalid unless they comply with the terms of the document.”  None of these treatments of
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a publication rule entail the conclusion that it has “treat[ed] the document in the same manner as
... a legislative rule.”  That requires a further step.
In Hoctor,  the Department had taken that step.  It compounded its internal error by
arguing to the courts as if they, too, were constrained by the agency’s approach.
The only ground on which the Department defends sanctioning Hoctor for not
having a high enough fence is that requiring an eight-foot-high perimeter fence for
dangerous animals is an interpretation of the Department's own structural-strength
regulation, and "provided an agency's interpretation of its own regulations does
not violate the Constitution or a federal statute, it must be given 'controlling
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.' "  Stinson
v. United States, supra, 508 U.S. at 44-46, 113 S.Ct. at 1919.70 
The Department, thus, appeared to be arguing that its interpretation, qua interpretation, bound
both Hoctor and, in a sense arguably even stronger than Chevron,71 the court.  
Stinson is yet another outcropping of the proposition that an agency’s interpretation of its
own rules has “controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation”72 – that “a reviewing court must accept ‘a plausible construction of the ... regulation’
even if it is not ‘the best or most natural one by grammatical or other standards.’”73  In his
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remarkable first work, “Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Rules,”74 my
colleague John Manning forcefully suggested a constitutional basis, grounded in separation of
powers considerations, for concluding that the proper deference model for agency self-
interpretations that are not in themselves the exercise of delegated lawmaking authority ought
rather to be the Skidmore model.  An increasingly rich literature unnecessary to imitate here has
pointed in similar directions in recent years;75 – and perhaps, as Richard Pierce has suggested,
Christensen will be found to open the door to such a reconsideration.76  Although the last few
lines of Christensen indicate that agency interpretations of their own rules may still be regarded as
controlling if textually available, Manning’s arguments were not considered there; and it is
becoming increasingly evident how much mischief the D.C. Circuit is being led into, in
understandable squirming to avoid this particular hook.77  
As Prof.  Anthony has long argued, an agency ought not be able to claim for its
interpretation the capacity to overcome judicial judgment about its authority unless it has used the
procedures for lawmaking to adopt it.  As made here, this argument is based simply on the diction
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of Section 552 and the understanding it suggests, responsive to the levels of formality involved, of
the difference in effect  between publication rules and regulations.  Publication rules may be
binding within an agency hierarchy, as precedents are binding on the lower tribunals of a judicial
system; but “influence” seems the better account to give of their permitted force over others.   
Skidmore deference, not Stinson or Chevron obedience, is the right model for judges to deploy.78
Skidmore deference, it might be added, is not an empty idea, albeit it leaves the judge with
more responsibility for decision than the alternatives.  As Justice Jackson put the proposition in
that case, the judge’s obligation is to accord the agency’s view the weight properly owing “a body
of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance,” taking into account “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give
it the power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”  Respect for the agency’s view, given its
responsibilities and knowledge, is commanded by good administration; rejection of the considered
view of an agency “made in pursuance of official duty, based upon more specialized experience
and broader investigations and information than is likely to come to a judge in a particular case”
should be “justified by very good reasons.”79  
Judged against this explanation, readers of Justice Thomas’s opinion in Christensen might
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fairly think it gives little more than lip service to Skidmore.  Like both Skidmore and National
Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council, that case had presented a question of meaning under
the Fair Labor Standards Act, on which the Administrator had expressed a view in a manner
reflecting relatively careful consideration.80  Yet Justice Thomas’s opinion never considers the
Administrator’s view as if it had “weight” owing to its being the view of an official to whom
Congress had given responsibility and who had a superior ability to assess the importance of the
issue raised to overall program.  Rather, he presents the statutory question as argued by the
advocates before the Court, characterizes the government’s arguments as “unpersuasive” and
shows how he believes the statutory question should be resolved.  Only then does he turn to the
question of the Department’s opinion letter, and after explaining why Skidmore deference rather
than Chevron obedience is the proper model, his full discussion is this:  “As explained above, we
find unpersuasive the agency’s interpretation of the statute at issue in this case.”  Justice Jackson’s
factors and considerations nowhere appear.   
The idea of giving an agency’s reasoning and judgment weight without according them
controlling force is not an empty trope, but a familiar judicial construct.  The contrast may be seen
in Chevron itself.  Step one of the Chevron analysis requires the court to delineate for itself, to
the extent it can, the judgments Congress has made, using “traditional tools of statutory con-
struction.”81  Then, having decided for itself what the statute could mean, with the responsibility
DRAFT.  All rights reserved.
Not for citation, quotation or further distribution without the author’s written consent.
82   Ibid.  This way of putting the Chevron proposition was recently confirmed in Whitman v.  American Trucking
Assn, ___ U.S. ___ (2/27/2001), where the Court thus summarized its statutory reading:  "We conclude, however, that the
agency's interpretation goes beyond the limits of what is ambiguous, and contradicts what in our view is quite clear." [IV(B)¶1]  
That is, the Step 1 question is whether the agency has attached to the statute a meaning it cannot bear, not (as it is too often
put) whether the statute precisely resolves the question.  
83   310 U.S. 534,   (1940).
84   Id.  at ___, quoting Norwegian Nitrogen Prod.  Co.  v.  United States, 288 U.S. 294 (19 ); compare SEC v.
Collier, 76 F.  2d 939 (2d Cir.  1939)(per L. Hand, J.) (Testimony at hearing by government official does not control
interpretation, but supports it); Universal Camera Co.  v.  NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951)(NLRB is not appellate tribunal in
relation to hearing officer’s conclusions, but nonetheless those conclusions have weight in the record on the basis of which its
judgment is to be reviewed). 
Interpretive rules.wpd, draft of March 9, 2001   Page 46 of 67
to reject “administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent”82 – that is,
outside this judicially delineated range of possible meaning – the court is obliged to accept
reasonable agency constructions that are within the range of possibilities it has independently
found.  This second step, the one that has attracted so much attention in the literature, is the step
at which Chevron obedience is called for.  But the Court has long described the “traditional tools
of statutory construction” to be independently deployed by the courts at step one to include
consideration of agency interpretations.  “The interpretation of the meaning of statutes,” the
Court sixty years ago confirmed in United States v.  American Trucking Assns,83 is “exclusively a
judicial function.”  Yet, the Court later observed in the same opinion, 
In any case [in which questions of statutory construction arise that have also been
confronted by an agency responsible for administration of the statute in question,
its] interpretations are entitled to great weight.  This is particularly true here,
where the interpretations involve ‘contemporaneous construction of a statute by
the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of
making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and
new.’  Furthermore, the [agency’s] interpretation gains much persuasiveness from
the fact that it was the [agency] which suggested the provisions’ enactment to
Congress.84
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“Weight” means that they are factors to be worked into the analysis alongside other traditional
tools, such as independent reading of the text.  The unmistakably judicial task of limning the
statute’s possible meaning is incorrectly performed if they are not considered – just as it would be
incorrectly performed if the text, or coordinate statutes, or other “traditional tools” were not
considered.  It is precisely here that, in practice, the majority opinion in Christensen failed to
deliver on its Skidmore promise.  It treated the agency’s view of its authority as if it were merely
the argument of an advocate’s brief, and not vital evidence of meaning that should inform its own
decision.
Justice Scalia, in a lonely concurrence, distanced himself from Skidmore.  The Chevron
rationale, he argued, was not limited to the context of regulations, and subsequent holdings had
applied Chevron to a variety of “authoritative agency positions” that were not the product either
of notice and comment rulemaking or of formal agency adjudication.  Chevron therefore had
displaced Skidmore.  It is remarkable to find a Justice who in the past has been so attentive to
arguments about the precise basis of agency power85 so accepting of the proposition that agency
actions not constituting an exercise of delegated procedural authority could so restrict judicial
decision.86  As he clearly regards such actions as the exercise of executive authority,87 his view
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may be grounded in the expansive visions of presidential authority (and hesitations about judicial
authority) he has voiced in other contexts.88  Yet it is striking that decisional responsibility in
Christensen inevitably lay in the courts; as had been the case in Skidmore, this was litigation
between “private” parties (one of them a county) about their rights and duties under federal law;
the federal administrator, who had not purported to act in any other than an advisory capacity,
had no formal role in this dispute and was not a party to it.  At times, Justice Scalia has seemed to
enjoy playing the bull in the administrative law china shop.  Thus, in Allentown Mack Service and
Sales, Inc.  v.  NLRB,89 he blithely overlooked half a century’s understanding that the Court
would not itself perform substantial evidence review.90  In  ADAPSO v.  Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System,91 an opinion he wrote while sitting on the D.C. Circuit, he denied
possibilities for different standards on judicial review of agency fact-finding of equal pedigree.92 
Distrusting the capacity for judicial judgment,93 he appears to be uncomfortable with the idea of
“weight,” as distinct from control.  In the habits of a common law judiciary, however, it is the
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most familiar of ideas.
Note that the analysis here goes only to the issue of authority – whether a publication rule
is ultra vires the agency’s statutory and regulation framework, and not whether it constitutes
sound policy.  The impulse underlying the formulations in Seminole Rock, Stinson, and the like is
the defense of agencies from judicial intrusions into the policy arena – an impulse that pervades
the judicial oeuvre on judicial review, as in Chevron itself.  Whether an agency has authority to
act is not, in itself, a question of policy; careful attention to the question of authority, then, does
not preclude accepting an agency’s initiative within the arena in which its authority is secure.94 
Authority having been found, the judicial respect for agency responsibility taught by Seminole
Rock and Stinson can take full hold. 
IV. The Problem of Authority for Publication Rules
That an administrative agency must have authority to act in a manner adversely affecting
private interests is a central proposition of American administrative law.95  If Skidmore deference
for an agency’s determination that its constitutive statutes and regulations authorize a publication
rule is a necessary element in analyzing that question, nonetheless the inquiry – like Chevron’s
first step – is an independent one.  A number of considerations suggest, as well, that it be seri-
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ously undertaken, in particular that courts need not hesitate so much as they would with statutory
text to find a regulation insufficiently precise to authorize challenged agency action.96
Questions about the adequacy of statutory precision, whether described in terms of vague-
ness or of delegation, are freighted with separation of powers considerations restricting their use.
For a court to review the sufficiency of the legislative effort is both legally and politically a haz-
ardous enterprise.   When confronting Congress’s choices about the extent to which it should
legislate, and the extent to which it will leave matters to others, the courts are, by confession,
lacking in judicially manageable standards.97  The prohibition against excessive delegation of
legislative authority, although frequently enough mentioned, is rarely enforced; “[o]nce it is
conceded, as it must be, that no statute can be entirely precise, and that some judgments, even
judgments involving policy considerations, must be left to the officers executing the law and to
the judges applying it, the debate over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a
point of principle but over a question of degree.”98  For coordinate institutions sharing
constitutional authority, the Congress and the Court, this conclusion drives the resulting
emptiness of the doctrine; the courts could hardly undertake continuously to instruct Congress
how better to perform its business without “expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
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branches of government.”99   For statutes, “vagueness” too is a constitutional construct, and a
conclusion that a statute is impermissibly vague equally criticizes the legislative effort, asserting
that better work could have ben done.  Accordingly, the citizen’s claim to better definition than
Congress has given must be deeply grounded, and does not prevent Congress from assigning
significant responsibilities to administrative agencies.
Assuring sufficient precision in regulations is a less threatening task, for the performance
of which, given the existence of statutory as well as constitutional instructions, a court has more
tools at its disposal. Agencies are not constitutionally coordinate institutions with the courts,100
nor do their actions come with the political legitimacy statutes enjoy.  The agency’s statute and
the general framework of its administration provide a context within which the reasonable
possibility of drafting regulations of greater specificity can be more confidently assessed; and there
is no constitutionally grounded inhibition to making that assessment.  Congress, moreover, can
only legislate; unlike an administrative agency, it possesses no less formal means by which to
generate norms significantly influencing private conduct.  For this reason, it has a motivation for
optimizing the precision of its statutes that agencies lack for their regulations.101  Policing the
adequacy of regulations to support subsequent publication rulemaking, then, both poses fewer
institutional threats, and offers safeguards against agency abuses.  “A substantive regulation must
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have sufficient content and definitiveness as to be a meaningful exercise in agency lawmaking.  It
is certainly not open to an agency to promulgate mush and then give it concrete form only
through subsequent less formal ‘interpretations.’”102 
Permitting courts to supervise the adequacy of agency’s  regulatory effort is hardly
without hazard.   The task is unmistakably connected with agency business, and the chance that an
independent judicial reading will blunder through incomprehension, or intrude the judiciary into
what is properly the agency’s policy realm, is correspondingly increased.  There is, as always, the
sometimes difficult judicial obligation to respect Congress’s assignments of responsibilities for
decision.  These responsibilities include allocating the agency’s finite resources in support of its
effort, and judges will often find it hard to identify or appreciate that resource constraint.103  
Particularly important, then, is that the reviewing court approach any question about the
adequacy of an agency’s drafting effort – whether it has done better than to produce “mush” –
with an appreciation for the full task the agency faced.  Litigation is a poor setting in which to
attempt to understand the context in which challenged particulars have appeared to an agency. 
Parties present a particular detail of the regulatory scheme that has impinged on them.  Avoiding a
disproportionate response requires the effort to see the issue in the frame of the agency’s time and
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resources.104  Just as procedural due process analysis must be “shaped by the risk of error inherent
in the truthfinding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions,”105
consideration of the adequacy of an agency’s rulemaking effort must be shaped by the effort in
general, not just some particular outcome about which complaint is later made.  In Hoctor, for
example, the adequacy of the Department’s containment standard for big cats is better seen in the
context of its full complement of regulations under the Animal Welfare Act, in which common
species are provided for in much more detail, than as the isolated question, “Could the
Department have done more here?”  The answer to the isolated question will always be “Yes,” yet
a court finding a general effort to regulate in some detail ought more properly to understand the
resource constraints and priority choices an agency will have faced, and to assess the adequacy of
the particular regulation being challenged in that context.
Also essential is the acceptance of “standards” rather than “rules” as an adequate
performance of the obligation to create sufficiently specific regulations.  A standard, we can note,
is precisely the kind of rule that is most familiar to, and comfortable within, the world of common-
law precedent.  Issues of negligence are issues about the behavior of “reasonable people.”  An
individual facing liability for some past act or having to plan future conduct is not thought unfairly
treated when her behavior is measured against this very generalized prescription – having
attention, of course, to the detailed characteristics of her behavior in its context, as well as to the
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results that have been reached in applying the same standards to other congeries of fact.  Nor is it
thought unfair in any sense, that other juries and judges in other cases have had no more precise
instructions, and that the parameters of her enforceable obligation emerge hazily and imprecisely
from their practice.106 
V.  “Rules” Explicating “Standards”
Is it an independent problem that the inspector’s manual underlying Hoctor departed from
the standard-based approach of the regulation, and embodied a norm that we would recognize as
a rule – eight feet?  One can easily understand why, either in instructing its inspectors or in
creating safe harbors for those it regulates, the Department would prefer to give exact parameters;
the impulses are, respectively, to control the discretion of a distant employee in her dealings with
the public, and to give the public the assurance of a clear definition.  Waxing jurisprudential,
Judge Posner seemed to find this shift troubling in and of itself, calling attention to the differences
between courts, developing law case-by-case through precedent, and legislatures, and suggesting
that the Department’s instructions could not properly be called interpretive.
At the other extreme from what might be called normal or routine interpretation is
the making of ... rules that are consistent with the statute or regulation under
which the rules are promulgated but not derived from it ... .  There is no way to
reason to an eight-foot perimeter-fence rule as opposed to a seven-and-a-half foot
fence or a nine-foot fence or a ten-foot fence.  
The reason courts refuse to create statutes of limitations is precisely the difficulty
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of reasoning to a number by the methods of reasoning used by courts.  Hemmings
v. Barian, 822 F.2d 688, 689 (7th Cir.1987).   One cannot extract from the
concept of a tort that a tort suit should be barred unless brought within one, or
two, or three, or five years.   The choice is arbitrary and courts are uncomfortable
with making arbitrary choices.   They see this as a legislative function.   Legislators
have the democratic legitimacy to make choices among value judgments, choices
based on hunch or guesswork or even the toss of a coin, and other arbitrary
choices.   When agencies base rules on arbitrary choices they are legislating, and so
these rules are legislative or substantive and require notice and comment
rulemaking, a procedure that is analogous to the procedure employed by
legislatures in making statutes.  The notice of proposed rulemaking corresponds to
the bill and the reception of written comments to the hearing on the bill.107
But, as he quickly recognizes, this approach is unsustainable; if it is preferable that rulemaking
have the adjudicatory quality of announcing standards rather than rules, a staff’s identification of a
safe harbor in any scientific or technological matter will often have rulish qualities – it will set
parameters the staff have concluded meet the agency’s standards.  
Even in a nontechnical area the use of a number as a rule of thumb to guide the
application of a general norm will often be legitimately interpretive.   Had the
Department of Agriculture said in the internal memorandum that it could not
imagine a case in which a perimeter fence for dangerous animals that was lower
than eight feet would provide secure containment, and would therefore presume,
subject to rebuttal, that a lower fence was insecure, it would have been on stronger
ground.   For it would have been tying the rule to the animating standard, that of
secure containment, rather than making it stand free of the standard, self-
contained, unbending, arbitrary.108
“Self-contained, unbending” is the key; the agency tied the claim of violation not to the rule, but
to the “interpretation.”  To reason in that way is to abandon the hierarchical and malleable
DRAFT.  All rights reserved.
Not for citation, quotation or further distribution without the author’s written consent.
109 A different question would be presented if one believed that the regulation, uninterpreted, simply failed to give the
level of notice required to sustain an agency fine.  See Manning, n.  above, 96 Colum L Rev at 670 n. 281.
Interpretive rules.wpd, draft of March 9, 2001   Page 56 of 67
precedential model for the rigid and universally binding model of legislation.  To have that effect
on external worlds, private or judicial, the agency must act with the formality of notice and
comment rulemaking or adjudication.  But had it retained the standard as the ultimate basis for
enforcement,  no problem would have arisen from a choice to supplement that standard with an
explanatory rule.
VI.  Reliance, Non-Acquiescence, Estoppel, and other Confusions
Now it seems appropriate to turn to the complicating issue of reliance, of investment-
backed expectations.  Hoctor built his perimeter fence to six feet on the advice of the Depart-
ment’s local veterinarian.  Isn’t he entitled to rely on that advice?109  The stated facts, indeed,
make it appear that the Department left him alone for seven years before asserting that he had not
provided the required secure containment, so perhaps it thought he was owed at least a certain a-
mount of credit for his reliance.  The low perimeter fence was but one of a range of violations it
asserted – suggesting the possibility that his facility had become seriously deficient (or that he had
encountered the misfortune of a throw-the-book-at-‘im inspector).  Note, however, that if we
take this road we are binding the Department to an interpretation – the 1982 interpretation given
Hoctor by its local veterinarian – with no sign that that interpretation ever acquired the dignity of
departmental policy.
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Similar issues also figure importantly in another recent decision about interpretive rules
and policy statements that is otherwise quite hard to understand.  In Alaska Professional Hunters
Assn v. FAA,110 the question concerned interpretation of an FAA rule specifying the equipment
required of commercial operators in aviation.  In 1963, the Civil Aeronautics Board had in agency
adjudication interpreted the CAB’s similar rule not to reach Alaskan hunting guides who flew
clients on hunting excursions from their camps as part of tour packages.  FAA’s Alaska regional
office then began acting on the same interpretation of the FAA’s rule.   It never committed that
interpretation to writing, and there is no indication that the FAA’s national office knew of it. 
Beginning in 1990, the national office of the FAA began to study the matter, with informal input
from the Association,111 and in 1998 it published a notice announcing it would henceforth
interpret its regulations to treat professional hunting guides, in Alaska as elsewhere, as
commercial operators.  The D.C. Circuit held that the regional office’s prior practice constituted a
“definitive interpretation” of the FAA regulations involved, and that since the FAA had already
interpreted its regulations through the actions of its Alaska regional office, it could not reinterpret
them without engaging in notice and comment rulemaking.
Note that two propositions are implicit here: the first, that a series of actions in remote
agency offices, neither known to nor sanctioned by its central offices, can constitute a “definitive
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interpretation” of its regulations; and, second, that such an interpretation, once informally
adopted, freezes the state of agency law, which cannot subsequently be altered without notice and
comment rulemaking.112
Does a policy that was never advertently adopted by any central office of the agency as a
whole, formally or informally, count as agency law, that could be binding on anyone?  To ask the
question that way is to invoke yet another collection of confused and unsatisfactory pages about
agency behavior.  On the one hand, one can point to a number of private litigants’ campaigns,
generally unsuccessful, to discover a course of conduct that has developed here and there within
an agency and then attempt to claim the benefit of this “secret law” on the basis of requirements
of consistency.  Associated with these failures is the hoary doctrine that an agency will not be
estopped by the error of some functionary – Mr. Merrill could not collect on his crop insurance,
albeit he had paid the premium to a local officer of the Department of Agriculture, who had
unconditionally accepted it.  The understanding here is that government is large and complex, and
its individual agents imperfectly controlled, humanly capable of error, even on occasion corrupt. 
Holding government bound by the errors of its functionaries, even in individual dealings marked
by strong reliance, would open too wide the doors of chicanery and adventitious dispute.113  On
the other hand, an agency that has consistently followed a given policy ought at the minimum
DRAFT  All rights reserved.
Not for citation, quotation or further distribution without the author’s written consent.
114   See, e,g,, Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 286-87 (D.C.Cir. 1997).
Interpretive rules.wpd, draft of March 9, 2001   Page 59 of 67
explain the basis for any change.114  The authority to make and implement policy, often to the
substantial disadvantage of private individuals, carries with it an obligation of evenhandedness and
demonstrable reason.  In some circumstances, the propriety of reliance on the policy as it is even
precludes changes that attach negative consequences to past, completed behavior.
From the perspective of the system of judicial precedent, the opinion of a single trial judge
or coordinate judicial tribunal, even if not challenged by government attorneys, would not control
the decisions of other trial judges or, particularly, appellate courts in subsequent cases.  That
police and prosecutors have rarely bothered with people driving more slowly than 65 miles per
hour in a 55 mile per hour zone, and that fact leads a large number of drivers to set cruise control
at 64, does not preclude a speeding ticket for going 64 – even if one could find a memo from the
responsible chief enforcement officer instructing the police to not to pursue such drivers. 
Certainly we wouldn’t think that if the Commandant of the State Police discovered that Troop K,
responsible for a distant and unpopulated part of the state, had a policy of arresting only people
exceeding 85 miles per hour, that made the speed limit in that part of the state, much less the
whole state, 85 – irrespective of how many citizens of Troop K’s counties knew of its practice
and had bought Lamborghinis.  We would be concerned if we found patterns of, say, racial
discrimination underlying differential enforcement; but absent such special circumstances, the
speed limit for all of us would remain at 55 – and it would remain there even if the occasional trial
judge in Troop K’s county acquitted a speeder charged with doing 70.  Should the FAA’s
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position be any different?
This question, in turn, breaks into two parts: respecting past conduct, while the policy is in
place, our response may be influenced by considerations of reliance, and the instincts about
unfairness that attach to them.  If the policy was widely known, however inappropriate, and if it
was characterized by investment-backed expectations, punishing behavior permitted by that policy
raises questions for an agency, that can act prospectively, that are not faced by a court. 
Respecting future conduct, however, the only questions are about the modality of change.  For
Troop K’s policy, never affirmatively adopted at Headquarters, at best known and tolerated, isn’t
it hard to imagine that more than an expression of disapproval is required?  The agency has never
acted in those modes that officially work to create agency “law”; even if we are willing to say that
such law has in some sense accreted from conduct in the regions, trial judgments, and the like,
treating that conclusion as the equivalent of formal agency adoption of the policy runs all the risks
the conventional government estoppel doctrine stands against.  When the DC Circuit says, as it
did, that the FAA can alter the informal but longstanding policy of its Alaska regional office only
by engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking, it stands conventional ideas about precedential
systems on their head: now the hierarchical superior is “bound” by the actions of an inferior
tribunal in a most powerful way – it is required to expend procedural resources to control the
judgments of inferior offices who followed no procedure to adopt a position they had no authority
to adopt.
As one who has sharply criticized the Supreme Court for its failure to respect the steady
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and uncontroversial accretion of law in the circuit courts of appeal,115 I should be careful to
distinguish between an obligation to identify and promulgate a preferred policy – to which, in my
judgment, the FAA can properly be held – and an obligation to do so following procedures more
formal than need have attended its initial formulation.  If one interpretation of its enabling statutes
and/or rules has come to be accepted, even in just a part of its domain, it can be held to announce
and explain a new interpretation.  But if that prior interpretation did not require notice-and-
comment rulemaking to take effect, indeed was simply the product of lower-level inertia and
practice over time, requiring the FAA to follow those procedures inflicts an unsustainable
formality on the relationship between the FAA and its inferior offices – empowers the regions,
weakens the center, imposes a requirement of vigilance, of detailed oversight and control, with
evident implications for how the agency expends its resources.    Whatever might be the reliance
equities of the particular individuals who were the beneficiaries of the initial action, it is hard to
imagine a compelling case for placing the agency in such a procedural straightjacket.  
Even when the first interpretation has come from national headquarters, a rule restricting
the agency to one interpretive bite at the apple seems more likely to be the product of fears about
Chevron or Stinson effects than sensible appreciation for the bureaucratic situation within the
agency.  There may of course be an obligation to explain, to justify, the agency’s changed
course;116 but unless one believes the new course to be binding in a strong sense – to be capable of
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serving in and of itself as the basis for a determination of violation, to “bind” a subsequent
reviewing court – such strait-jacketing of an agency’s policymaking would be unsupported in
either the APA or Chevron’s explicit recognition of the appropriateness of agency revisions over
time.  Indeed, one could imagine its impulse as being to suppress rather than to encourage agency
interpretation.  In an earlier decision from which Alaska Professional Hunters drew supportive
dicta, powerfully criticized by Professor Pierce,117 the Department of Justice had been silent about
the interpretation it would give a regulation adopted under the Americans with Disabilities Act –
whether it would interpret that regulation’s requirement of unimpaired sight lines for wheelchair-
bound sports spectators to include moments when the crowd had leapt to its feet or not.  A
stadium was sued after it built to the less expensive negative interpretation, the Department
having subsequently taken the more demanding view.  The demanding view prevailed, but only,
the court said, because the Department had “never authoritatively adopted a position.”  Had it
done so, “to allow an agency to make a fundamental change in its interpretation of a substantive
regulation without notice and comment would undermine [the APA’s rulemaking]
requirements.118  This puts a high price indeed on ever giving interpretive advice.
Perhaps what this aspect of the two decisions draws on is the bromide expressing strong
judicial reluctance to revisit issues of statutory interpretation, once they have been finally decided. 
That, the courts have generally insisted, is Congress’s business.  A kind of conscious parallelism
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applied to rulemaking would hold, too, that once a rule had been “interpreted,” its revision was
for the legislature – that is, for rulemaking rather than further interpretation.  But the parallel here
is a false one – particularly as we see that what gets denominated an interpretation for these
purposes need never have attracted the attention of national officials, may indeed only have been
in effect in one remote region.  Congress and Court are co-equal branches of government, and the
bromide is generally defended on bases that have at best imperfect agency analogs: the final
interpretation that can have this judiciary-binding effect is only one that comes from the Supreme
Court,119 but agency interpretations can flow from a wide range of offices, perhaps (as here) never
even taking written form; the bromide reflects the greater legitimacy of Congress over the courts
as a source of national law, but there is no corresponding division in the world of the
administrative agency – rather, general considerations of hierarchical authority which this
approach tends to defeat; the bromide also assumes something about interpretation in relation to a
statute, that it derives a compelled or logically justified position from the language it interprets,
yet the very existence of Section 552(a), and also much judicial doctrine,120 supposes that neither
agency statutes nor agency regulations entail such singular meanings.  Agency interpretations can
change.121
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This brings us squarely back to the issues of reliance.  At least two substantial difficulties
would attend this approach.  The first is that under the standard, albeit often criticized, estoppel
doctrine, Hoctor had no right to rely on the advice offered by a local official of the Department.122 
Second, even were the earlier advice the product of departmental policy – a prior edition of the
inspector’s manual, say – it is difficult to imagine a persuasive claim to more than “time to
conform” (which Hoctor apparently had) for a change in interpretation grounded in safety, and
which the agency was otherwise free to make.  Suppose, in the nuclear context, that staff
interpreting a Nuclear Regulatory Commission rule requiring containments for nuclear power
plants to meet certain safety standards had expressed its opinion that welds of a certain
description would satisfy that requirement.  While that interpretation remains among the
Commission’s regulatory guidance, it provides a safe harbor for plant owners.  Suppose, however,
that subsequent events persuade the staff that its judgment was wrong, and that to meet the same
standards a more elaborate weld is required.  The owner of a plant who had invested millions in
those welds would have to be afforded the opportunity to show that its welds in fact met the
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unamended standard; but it would no longer have any claim that it had satisfied the regulation just
because it had satisfied the parameters of the first interpretation.  Writings in this context imagine
a balance between governmental and private interests, one unlikely to be resolved in a safety
context by constructing an interminable, vested right to continue in a course now believed to be
unsafe.123  Perhaps for these reasons, Judge Posner in Hoctor attached no express value to
reliance considerations, even though expressing in a variety of ways considerable doubt about the
safety merits.
VII.  Conclusion
An agency that well understood the approaches explored here would restrict itself to using
its guidance, interpretive and policy documents in a precedential way.  It would never claim for
them the force that we associate with statutes – either when it was in court, or when it was
dealing face-to-face with citizens.  It would accept, even encourage, the appropriateness of citizen
reliance on advice once given, defeating that reliance only in the face of demonstrably greater
public need for change.  Of course, this would not end all issues.  The costliness of notice-and-
comment rulemaking these days, if unremedied (as it appears likely it will be), will continue to
generate pressure on agencies to attempt to do by indirection what they cannot afford to do as
they should. 
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 Yet fear of this phenomenon, however well-based, ought not to tempt the courts, as it
unfortunately has, into locutions that discourage advice-giving or provoke agencies into
accompanying their advice with warnings that it cannot be relied upon.124  That is indeed a
perverse teaching for the agency, and outcome for the public.  The Supreme Court has told us,
emphatically, that agency conclusions about enforcement priorities are, and for important reasons
of state, as remote from judicial control as the actions of the administrative state can be.125  
Nonetheless,  the DC Circuit has, and more than once, told an administrative agency that adoption
and public explanation of an enforcement policy can only be achieved by notice and comment
rulemaking.126  These, too, are complicated questions, and they are best left for full discussion
elsewhere.127  What they have in common with today’s question, in my judgment, is a certain
confusion about what it means to interpret or to set a policy – a confusion also encouraged by our
ideas about reliance, and by fear that propositions calling for respect for agency judgment entail
judicial powerlessness.  Recalling Skidmore, the model of precedent, of influence rather than
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command, may serve to alleviate these concerns and reclaim for publication rules their intended,
and valued, place.
